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Privatization in Pennsylvania: How
Reforming the Pennsylvania Liquor Code




Privatization, in the context of alcohol sales, refers to the act of a
state government relinquishing its monopoly over sales of alcohol and
issuing alcohol sales licenses to private businesses. Despite evidence
showing that privatization generally increases the convenience of
purchasing alcohol and could possibly lead to lower prices of alcohol,
Pennsylvania is part of a shrinking minority of states that has held strong
to its monopoly system and rejected numerous political efforts to adopt a
private license system. As a result, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
undergoes constant criticism for maintaining a monopoly system that is
not only outdated but is also no longer needed to serve the purposes for
which the monopoly system was originally created.
This Comment discusses the evolution of Pennsylvania's liquor law
and compares the defining features of monopoly systems and private
license systems. This Comment will also analyze the risks and benefits
of privatizing alcohol sales in Pennsylvania. Ultimately, this Comment
recommends that Pennsylvania abandon its current monopoly system and
adopt a privatized license system. By adopting a license system, the
Commonwealth would experience social and economic benefits.
Moreover, privatization would bring Pennsylvania's liquor code into the
modem age, leaving behind a system that was put in place for antiquated
reasons.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"[A]nti-consumer,"' "archaic,,,2 "broken,",3 and "bizarre" are all
words that people have used to describe Pennsylvania's current system
governing the sale of alcohol,4 where the government is the exclusive
seller of alcohol throughout the Commonwealth.5  Pennsylvania's
dedication to an antiquated system of alcohol sales has invited much
criticism from politicians and citizens alike. Pennsylvania Chamber of
Business and Industry President Gene Barr urged that "[ut's time for
Pennsylvania's antiquated monopoly on liquor sales to end," arguing that
1. Op-Ed., GOP Should End PA Liquor Monopoly, STANDARDSPEAKER.COM *Nov.
5, 2010), http://m.standardspeaker.com/opinion/gop-should-end-pa-liquor-monopoly-
1.1060040.
2. Nick Voutsinos, Op-Ed., Privatization of Pennsylvania's Liquor: The Better
Alternative to a Broken System, PrrT NEws (Jan. 20, 2014, 8:31 PM),
http ://www.pittnews .com/opinion/article_8 39c 141 a-823b- 11 e3-bfae-00 I a4bcf6878.html.
3. Id.
4. Op-Ed., Pennsylvania's Booze Monopoly, WASH. TIMES (July 4, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/4/pennsylvanias-booze-monopoly/.
5. See infra Part II.B.
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"selling alcohol is not a core function of state government."6 Even the
former Chairman of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, Jonathan
Newman, denounced Pennsylvania's current system for selling alcohol
as being an "anti-consumer system," and "socialist-type system" that is
"insulting to Pennsylvanians."'7
In addition to the public disapproval expressed by President BarrS
and Chairman Newman,9 a majority of Pennsylvania voters have recently
expressed support for privatizing Pennsylvania's alcohol sales system. 10
From 2010 through 2013, annual surveys have revealed that over 50
percent, and often as high as over 60 percent, of Pennsylvanians support
privatization. 1"
In response to Pennsylvania voters' demand for privatization, the
Commonwealth's Governors have been far from silent. 12 Former
Governor Richard "Dick" Thornburgh,13 described privatization as "a
self-evident proposition that the state shouldn't be in the [alcohol sales]
business."14 Similarly, former Governor Thomas "Tom" Ridge,15 also
6. See Press Release, Pa. Chamber of Bus. & Indus., Business Groups Call on
Lawmakers to End Pennsylvania's Liquor Monopoly (Mar. 13, 2013) (available at
https://www.pachamber.org/newsroom/press-releases/pdf/88.pdf).
7. See William Bender, Inconvenience Stores: Since '33, LCB has made the
Purchase of Alcohol Tough, Pricy, PHILLY.COM (July 27, 2011),
http://articles.philly.com/2011-07-27/news/29820953-1-johnstown-flood-tax-lcb-turzai.
8. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
9. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. Infra note 11 and accompanying text.
11. See PETER BROWN, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST., PENNSYLVANIA VOTERS
HOPEFUL FOR NEW GOVERNOR, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL FINDS; SELLING LIQUOR
STORES IS Top CHOICE TO BALANCE BUDGET 5 (2010) (surveying 1584 Pennsylvania
voters and finding that 66% of Pennsylvania voters thought that the Commonwealth
should sell liquor licenses to private businesses in order to help balance the
Commonwealth's budget); TIM MALLOY, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST.,
PENNSYLVANIA Gov BATTING .500 WITH VOTERS, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL FINDS;
PRIVATIZE STATE STORES, NOT PARKS, VOTERS SAY 7 (2011) (surveying 1370 registered
voters and finding that 62% supported privatizing the Commonwealth's liquor stores);
Angela Couloumbis, Inquirer Poll Finds Wide Backing for Privatizing Liquor Sales,
PHILLY.COM (Nov. 1, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-1 -
01/news/34858753_lprivate-sector-support-privatization-beer-and-wine (finding, in a
survey of 600 likely Pennsylvania voters, that 55% supported privatization, while only
28% opposed privatization); HEART & MIND STRATEGIES, PRIVATIZATION STUDY RESULTS
7 (2013) (surveying 1151 Pennsylvanians and finding that 66% support privatization).
12. Infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
13. Governor Thornburgh was Governor of Pennsylvania from 1979 to 1987.
Governor Richard Lewis Thornburgh, PA HIST. & MUSEUM COMMISSION,
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/1 951 -
present/4285/richardjlewis thomburgh/471868 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
14. Bender, supra note 7.
15. Governor Ridge was Governor of Pennsylvania from 1995 to 2001. Governor
Thomas Joseph Ridge, PA. HIST. & MUSEUM COMMISSION,
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attempted to privatize alcohol sales in Pennsylvania.16  Despite the
efforts of both Governor Thornburgh and Governor Ridge, the
Commonwealth retained its monopoly system.17  Most recently,
Pennsylvania Governor Thomas "Tom" Corbett has been unable to
deliver the privatized system that his administration had hoped to
adopt,18 despite the potential benefits to be gained from privatization.'9
This Comment recommends that Pennsylvania should abandon its
current alcohol monopoly system in favor of a privatized license
system. 2 Part II will explain the historical reasons behind the adoption
of the Commonwealth's first monopoly system2' and describe
22Pennsylvania's current monopoly system. Part I will also compare
monopoly systems and privatized license systems and the divergent ways
that each system impacts critical economic and social factors within a
state. 23
Part III will describe two potential privatization plans available to
the Commonwealth.24 Part IV will begin with an analysis of the costs
and benefits of privatization, concluding that privatization under either
plan described in Part III would be beneficial for the Commonwealth and
its citizens.25 Part IV will also provide additional support for the pro-
privatization argument by revealing that the historical reasons for
adopting a monopoly system are no longer applicable to today's
Commonwealth.26 Part V concludes by recommending that the
Commonwealth adopt a privatization plan in light of the benefits of a
license system.27
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/1951-
present/4285/tom ridge/471870 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
16. See Sue Gleiter, Liquor Privatization Issue Down to the Wire as Lt. Gov. Jim




18. See Jeff Frantz, Could 2014 be the Year Pennsylvania's Liquor Privatization
Movement Reaches Full Proof?, PENN LIVE (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:35 AM),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/01/pennsylvania-alcohol-sales-pri.ht
ml.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part l.A.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part V.A.
26. See infra Part IV.B.




A. The History of Liquor Laws in Pennsylvania
To understand why Pennsylvania should privatize alcohol sales
today, it is first necessary to examine the reasons Pennsylvania initially
chose to monopolize alcohol sales.28  Pennsylvania's early laws
regulating the sale of alcohol established a private licensing system.'9
Under Pennsylvania's early licensing system, the Commonwealth sold
permits that allowed private retail establishments, such as grocery stores,
to sell liquor, beer, and wine.3° Pennsylvania operated under this
licensing system until the enactment of National Prohibition
31 in 1920,32
when a constitutional amendment prohibited the "manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors" in the United States.
33
Although Prohibition was only in effect for 13 years,34 the
consequences of the policy ultimately shaped the future of
Pennsylvania's liquor laws.35  One of the most significant effects of
Prohibition was the rise of bootleggers, who illegally obtained and sold
alcohol during the Prohibition era.36 The bootlegging business was so
profitable that bootleggers were "absolutely unscrupulous and [acted]
without regard for any of the rules of decency," employing "gunmen and
thugs to execute their will, and brib[ing] officials right and left."
37
Disgusted by the bootleggers' disregard for the law,38 Congress proposed
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See Act 405, 1858 Pa. Laws 365.
30. See Act 405, 1858 Pa. Laws 365 §§ 2, 13.
31. National Prohibition is also commonly known as "Prohibition," and the terms
will be used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
32. See Mihir A. Munshi, Comment, Share the Wine - Liquor Control in
Pennsylvania: A Timefor Reform, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 507, 514-15 (1997).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
34. See Everett S. Brown, The Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, 29 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1005, 1006 (1935).
35. See Harold Edward Fassberg, The Development of Liquor Control in
Pennsylvania 17 (June 10, 1940) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh) (on
file with the University of Pittsburgh Hillman Library).
36. See The National Prohibition Law: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 69th Cong. 1454 (1926) (defining bootlegging as the business of selling
alcoholic beverages to those who want to unlawfully buy them, and describing the
bootlegging business as "the real enemy of the Government and society").
37. The National Prohibition Law: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 69th Cong. 1464-65 (1926) (statement of L.C. Andrews, Assistant
Secretary in charge of Customs, Coast Guard and Prohibition).
38. See Fassberg, supra note 35, at 15.
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a Constitutional amendment to legalize liquor,39 and just one year later,
Pennsylvania ratified the amendment.4n
The bootleggers' lawlessness also concerned John D. Rockefeller
Jr., who described bootleggers as "a vast army of lawbreakers [that]
ha[d] been recruited and financed on a colossal scale.41 Consequently,
Rockefeller formed a committee which produced a report that ultimately
recommended that all states adopt monopoly systems after the repeal of
Prohibition.42 This recommendation carried immense weight in the eyes
of the American public because Rockefeller was a well-regarded social,
religious, and philanthropic figure.4 3 Heeding Rockefeller's advice,
Pennsylvania's then-Governor, Gifford Pinchot,44 sought to enact a
monopoly system that would allow the Commonwealth to strictly control
the sale of alcohol.45
Governor Pinchot's push towards a monopoly system in
Pennsylvania was also greatly impacted by the memory of problematic
saloons that existed throughout the country prior to Prohibition.46
Pennsylvania in particular was home to some of the wildest saloons,
resulting from comparatively liberal laws regarding alcohol sales and
distribution prior to Prohibition.47  The worst saloons promoted
drunkenness, as well as prostitution, gambling, and political corruption.48
Political bosses, for example, operated out of saloons and paid regular
saloon patrons to stuff ballot boxes located inside the saloons.49 Fearing
the return of corruption and debauchery following the repeal of
Prohibition, Governor Pinchot was determined to prevent the saloons'
comeback by adopting a monopolized system of alcohol sales and
distribution.5°
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
40. JOHNNY H. KILLIAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 108-17, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 38 n. 13 (2004).
41. John D. Rockefeller Jr., Text of Rockefeller's Letter to Dr. Butler, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 1932, at 12.
42. See generally RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR
CONTROL (1933) (presenting the findings of Rockefeller's committee).
43. See Rockefeller Move is a Dramatic One: His Wide Interest in Welfare Projects
Adds to Weight of His Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1932, at 12.
44. Governor Pinchot was Governor of Pennsylvania from 1923 to 1927 and 1931 to
1935. U.S. NE. FOREST EXPERIMENT STATION, PINCHOT: THE MAN, THE HOUSE, THE
LEGACY 4 (1976).
45. See Fassberg, supra note 35, at 18.
46. Id. at 12, 18.
47. See RICHARD A. MCGOWAN, PRIVATIZE THIS? 91(2011).
48. See MARK EDWARD LENDER & JAMES KIRBY MARTIN, DRINKING IN AMERICA: A





The Great Depression also played a role in Governor Pinchot's
decision to adopt a monopoly system in Pennsylvania.5' In the midst of
the Great Depression, proponents of the amendment repealing
Prohibition promised that the legal sale of alcohol across the nation
would stimulate state economies.52 Recognizing that the repeal of
Prohibition could potentially increase state revenue, Governor Pinchot
was further motivated to enact a monopoly system. He went so far as to
call a special session of the Pennsylvania General Assembly in order to
explore the monopoly system's potential for generating state revenue.53
Ultimately, Governor Pinchot succeeded in his efforts to bring a
monopoly system to Pennsylvania. 54  Shortly after the repeal of
Prohibition, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a series of
liquor control bills.55 The resulting monopoly system, enacted by the
1933 Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act,56 resembles the system still in
place today.57
B. Current Pennsylvania Liquor Laws
The Pennsylvania Liquor Code enables the Commonwealth to
strictly control the sale and distribution of alcohol.58  The
Commonwealth exercises this control through the Liquor Control
Board.59  The Liquor Control Board ("the Board") consists of three
members appointed by the Governor and approved by the state Senate.60
The Board has the exclusive authority to buy alcohol from
manufacturers.61 It then sets a price for and sells that alcohol at
Pennsylvania Liquor Stores, which are established in locations selected
by the Board.62  The Board alone operates and maintains these
establishments for direct consumer alcohol purchases.63  Retail
establishments such as hotels, restaurants, and clubs must be licensed by
the Board and are also eligible to purchase alcohol from the Board.64
51. See Fassberg, supra note 35, at 45.
52. See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation:
Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 THE MILBANK Q. 461, 464 (1991).
53. See Fassberg, supra note 35, at 45.
54. See id. at 48.
55. See McGOWAN, supra note 47, at 91.
56. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act, 1933-1934 Pa. Laws 4.
57. See infra Part II.B.
58. See generally 47 PA. STAT. ANN. (West 1997).
59. See 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2-201 (West Supp. 2013).
60. See id.
61. See id. at § 2-207.
62. See 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3-301 (West 1997).
63. See id.
64. See 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-401 (West Supp. 2013).
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More broadly, the Board has the authority "to control the manufacture,
possession, sale, consumption, importation, use, storage, transportation
and delivery" of alcohol.65
Essentially, the Pennsylvania government, through the Liquor
Control Board, controls virtually every aspect of distributing alcohol-
from purchasing the wholesale alcohol from manufacturers to selling it to
consumers in stores that are owned and operated by the government.
66
Due to the government's control over alcohol sales, Pennsylvania's
67alcohol sales system is defined as a monopoly system.
C. Monopoly Systems Versus License Systems
In states with monopoly systems, the state government takes
ownership of the alcohol at the wholesale level, retail level, or both
wholesale and retail levels.68 In contrast, in states with license systems,
the state government licenses private businesses to buy and sell
alcohol.69 Because the Commonwealth takes ownership of alcohol at
both the wholesale and retail levels, Pennsylvania is one of only 18 states
that operate under a monopoly system, while the remaining 32 states
operate under license systems.70
A state's decision to adopt a monopoly system or a license system
affects various aspects of the alcohol business and society as a whole.7
Economically, the type of system impacts state revenue, the price of
alcohol paid by the state's consumers, and the volume of alcohol sales
within the state.72 Socially, the choice of system affects the state's crime
rate, which in turn, impacts society in general.73
1. State Revenues
On average, states with monopoly systems generate significantly
greater alcohol-related revenues than states with license systems.74 This
65. See id. at § 2-207.
66. Supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
67. See infra Part II.C. Monopoly systems are sometimes called "control systems".
See THE ALCOHOL RESEARCH GRP., ALCOHOL CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION 1 (3d ed. 2011).
68. See THE ALCOHOL RESEARCH GRP., supra note 67, at 2.
69. Id. at 1-2.
70. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, Alcohol Beverage Control Boards,
TTB.GOv, http://www.ttb.gov/wine/state-ABC.shtml (last updated Oct. 30, 2013).
71. See generally PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., LIQUOR PRIVATIZATION ANALYSIS (final
report 2011).
72. See infra Part II.C.1-3.
73. See infra Part II.C.4.
74. See ROLAND ZULLO ET AL., THE FISCAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF STATE ALCOHOL
CONTROL SYSTEMS 45 (2013).
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difference in revenues is largely attributed to the different sources of
revenues between monopoly states and license states.75 Both monopoly
states and license states primarily generate revenue through alcohol sales
taxes and alcohol beverage licenses, but monopoly states generate
additional revenues through mark-ups
76 on the sale of alcohol products.77
Not only do mark-ups serve as an additional source of revenue for
monopoly states, mark-ups give monopoly states the ability to easily
increase their total alcohol-related revenues by increasing the amounts of
the mark-ups. When people are willing to pay more for alcohol, due to
inflation or product quality improvements, monopoly states can increase
mark-ups to capture the potential gain from the increased willingness to
78pay. In license states, any potential gain from increased willingness to
pay will be realized by private, licensed wholesalers and retailers, not by
the state government.79
License states cannot increase their alcohol-related revenues as
easily as monopoly states. License state governments obtain almost all
of their alcohol-related revenues from alcohol taxes,80 and all license
states use a gallonage tax, which is based solely on volume.81 Therefore,
assuming that the volume of alcohol consumption remains relatively
constant, a license state can only significantly increase its alcohol-related
revenue if the state's legislature raises the gallonage tax, a politically
unfavorable decision. 82
Although license states lack the ability to generate ever increasing
alcohol-related revenue from mark-ups, the total difference in alcohol-
related net income between monopoly states and license states is reduced
by two features of license systems. First, in license systems, individuals
absorb the costs of running privately-owned stores, whereas monopoly
state governments must spend a significant amount of the revenue from
alcohol sales on the expenses associated with operating state-owned
alcohol stores.83  Second, license states generate more revenue from
licensing fees than monopoly states because license states impose fees on
private wholesalers and retailers.84 Monopoly states do not impose such
75. See id.
76. In the context of this Comment, "mark-up" refers to the difference between the
prices that The Board pays for alcohol and the prices at which The Board sells alcohol.
77. See ZULLO ET AL., supra note 74, at 9-10.
78. See THE ALCOHOL RESEARCH GRP., supra note 67, at 5.
79. See id at 5-6.
80. See ZULLO ET AL., supra note 74, at 13.
81. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 8.
82. See THE ALCOHOL RESEARCH GRP., supra note 67, at 5-6, 11.
83. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 79.
84. See id. at 78.
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fees, as imposing a governmental fee on a store owned by the
85government would be counterproductive.
Despite the additional revenues from fees imposed on private
wholesalers and retailers in license states, revenues from alcohol sales in
monopoly states are at least 80 percent higher compared to those in
license states.86 But in order to receive the higher revenues, monopoly
states also must charge higher prices to consumers.
2. Price Paid by Consumers
License systems generally result in lower prices for alcohol,
compared to prices under monopoly systems.87 The price difference can
likely be explained by competition.88 Compared to states with monopoly
systems, license states tend to have substantially more alcohol retail
stores in relation to the states' populations, which increases competition
and provides incentive for store owners to keep their stores' prices as low
as possible.89 Under a monopoly system, the state government is the sole
owner and thus, without competition, has very little incentive to keep
prices down.90 Therefore, lower retail store density, combined with this
lack of competition, likely drives up the prices that consumers pay for
alcohol in monopoly system states.91
Further, implicit taxes92 in monopoly system states offer another
potential explanation for the higher alcohol prices under monopoly
systems.93  The implicit taxes in states with monopoly systems are
generally higher than the explicit taxes in license states.9 4 One possible
source of high implicit taxes is the need to compensate for inefficient
85. See id.
86. Monopoly states that take ownership of alcohol only at the wholesale level
generate approximately 82.4% higher alcohol-related per capita revenues than license
states. See ZULLO ET AL., supra note 74, at ii. Monopoly states that take ownership of
alcohol at both wholesale and retail levels generate approximately 90% higher revenues
than license states. See id.
87. See Michael Siegel et al., Differences in Liquor Prices Between Control State-
operated and License-state Retail Outlets in the United States, 108 ADDICTION 339, 343
(2012).




92. Implicit taxes are "indirect cost[s] that result[] from a government policy."
Implicit Tax, INVESTORWORDS, http://www.investorwords.com/15440/implicit-tax.html
(last visited July 29, 2014). The implicit taxes that this Comment refers to are indirect
costs that result from a state government's policy of distributing alcohol by a monopoly
system.
93. See Siegel et al., supra note 87, at 345.
94. Bruce L. Benson et al., Implicit Taxes Collected by State Liquor Monopolies,
115 PUB. CHOICE 313, 324 (2003).
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operations, such as paying higher salaries to employees in state-owned
stores, who often earn more than their private sector counterparts.95 As a
result of the decreased competition and the increased implicit taxes,
liquor prices in monopoly states are approximately 6.9 percent higher
than prices in license states.96 Partially due to lower prices, as well as
other factors, consumers in license states also tend to buy more alcohol
than those in monopoly states.
3. Sales and Consumption of Alcohol
On average, the volume of alcohol sales is greater in states with
license systems than states with monopoly systems.97  Consumer
convenience plays a significant role in the difference in sales volumes.98
In general, monopoly states have fewer alcohol retail stores per capita,
making alcohol less accessible than it is in license states.99
The different locations of alcohol stores in monopoly states versus
license states demonstrate how consumer convenience causes an
increased volume of alcohol sales in license states. In monopoly states,
retail stores owned by the state government often only sell alcohol and
alcohol-related accessories.00 In contrast, in license states, alcohol is
commonly sold at private businesses where consumers can also purchase
groceries and other domestic products.1 01 It is not difficult to imagine a
scenario where a person shopping for groceries might impulsively decide
to buy alcohol upon passing an alcohol display in the store. Conversely,
it is equally possible to imagine a person in a monopoly state who, while
shopping for groceries, considers purchasing alcohol, but forgoes the
purchase due to the inconvenience of needing to travel to an entirely
different store.
Another factor that leads to fewer sales in states with monopoly
systems is "border bleed".102  "Border bleed" is a phenomenon that
occurs when consumers leave their home state in order to purchase
alcohol from neighboring states. 103 Consumers will, in fact, travel
significant distances to cross state lines when they believe that the
neighboring state provides a better value. 104 For example, some residents
95. Seeid. at315.
96. See Siegel et al., supra note 87, at 343.
97. See ZULLO ET AL., supra note 74, at 35.
98. See id. at 34-35.
99. See id. at 34.
100. See id. at 34-35.
101. See id.
102. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 9.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 112.
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of Pennsylvania travel to neighboring states with license systems, such as
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey, to purchase alcohol.105 Overall,
due to a lack of consumer convenience or to individual consumer
decisions to purchase alcohol in a neighboring license state,'
06
populations in monopoly systems typically exhibit lower rates of alcohol
consumption."17 Adopting a license system, in contrast, tends to lead to a
substantial increase in alcohol consumption.0 8  Although economic
differences are clearly distinguishable between monopoly system states
and license system states, the privatization decision also engenders
differing social implications.
4. Social Factors
While recent Pennsylvania anti-privatization propaganda insists that
alcohol privatization will dramatically increase crime,'09 evidence
suggests that crime rates for most types of crime are unaffected by
privatization. A recent study has shown that state ownership of alcohol
retail stores did not significantly affect crime rates for 18 types of
crimes."0 In fact, states with government-owned alcohol retail stores
have reduced crime rates associated with only four types of crimes."'
Overall, the study found that selling hour restrictions and dram shop
laws, which allow servers of alcohol to be held liable for the actions of
105. See id. at 9.
106. See id.
107. See Minghao Her et al., Privatizing Alcohol Sales and Alcohol Consumption:
Evidence and Implications, 94 ADDICTION 1125, 1127 (1999).
108. See id. at 1130.
109. The most egregious example is a recent commercial aired throughout
Pennsylvania claiming that "[privatization] in North Carolina is killing one child every
week." Tell Your State Senator & State Representative: Say "NO" to Liquor
Privatization (United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 Apr. 2014), available
at http://video-
embed.pennlive.com/services/player/bcpid 1950981438001 ?bctid=3509054708001 &bcke
y-AQ--,AAAAQBxUwOE-,DELAM66vw4z-hO llhycwsWq-6Y4XfEN. For this
alarming statistic, the commercial cites to an article that in no way claims that
privatization is responsible for killing one child every week. See Keri Brown, NC Loses
One Child Per Week in Underage Drinking-Related Accidents, 88.5WFDD (Apr. 8, 2014,
6:00 AM), http://wfdd.org/post/nc-loses-one-child-week-underage-drinking-related-
accidents. In fact, the article makes no mention of privatization whatsoever and suggests
that education, not the institution of a monopoly system, is the solution to minimizing
underage drinking-related accidents. See id.
110. The 18 crime types unaffected by state ownership were: murder, robbery, rape,
theft (non-vehicle), burglary, vehicle theft, arson, drunkenness, liquor laws, DWI,
runaways, curfew, vagrancy, sex offenses, embezzlement, prostitution, disorderly
conduct, and manslaughter. See ZULLO ET AL., supra note 74, at 56-57.
111. The four crime types affected by state ownership were: aggravated assaults,
fraud, domestic abuse, and vandalism. See id. at 58.
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intoxicated customers, affect crime rates more significantly than the type
of ownership of alcohol retail stores. 
1 2
Furthermore, a study by the Commonwealth Foundation for Public
Policy Alternativesl l 3 specifically found that adopting a license system
does not result in increased drunk driving arrests or alcohol-related
driving deaths. 114 The study focuses on three states that recently partially
privatized alcohol retail sales.115  In all three states, after partial
privatization, alcohol-related driving fatalities decreased in total and in
proportion to total driving fatalities.116 While the study reported that
DUI arrests fluctuated in each state, the study found that the shifts to
privatization could not be directly linked to the fluctuations. 117 Overall,
the study concluded that privatization is not a threat to public safety.18
In light of the effects that monopoly systems and license systems have on
state revenues, alcohol prices, sales and consumption of alcohol, and
other social factors, the Commonwealth has taken a major step toward
privatization through the creation of detailed privatization plans. "9
III. PROPOSED PRIVATIZATION PLANS FOR PENNSYLVANIA
In 2011, the Pennsylvania Governor's Budget Office retained Public
Financial Management, Inc. ("PFM") to propose an alcohol privatization
plan.120 To guide PFM's research, the Pennsylvania Governor's Budget
Office instructed PFM that the proposed privatization plan should
achieve five key goals:
* Allow the free market to promote greater convenience and
price competition for Pennsylvania consumers.
* Assure strict enforcement of reasonable regulations to
protect the public and consumers.
112. See id.at58-59.
113. The Commonwealth Foundation for Public Policy Alternatives is a leading
Pennsylvania public policy group that "crafts free-market policies, convinces
Pennsylvanians of their benefits, and counters attacks on liberty." What is CF?,
COMMONWEALTH FOUND., http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/aboutI (last visited
July 29, 2014).
114. See REBECCA REES, THE COMMONWEALTH FOUND. FOR PUB. POLICY ALTS.,
PRIVATIZATION OF LIQUOR STORES: No THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY 8 (1997).
115. The three states studied are Iowa, West Virginia, and Ohio. Jd. at 2. West
Virginia began allowing private retail sales of wine and liquor. Id. Iowa began allowing
private retail and wholesale wine distribution and private retail sales of liquor. Id. Ohio
began allowing private sales of liquor through contract agencies. Id.
116. See id. at 9.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See infra Part III.
120. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 5.
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* Achieve up-front value of the franchise transfer to help
achieve other priority goals.
* Assure that the fiscal impact to the State is neutral going
forward.
* Consider the careers and economic well-being of state
employees impacted by the change. 12
1
Using the Governor's five goals, PFM recommended two alternative
privatization plans: 1) full privatization with limits, and 2) limited
wholesale and open retailing licensing. 1
22
A. PFM Plan 1: Full Privatization with Limits Approach
PFM's first recommended plan calls for "[flull privatization of both
wholesale and retail operations, with certain limits particularly around
number or types of licenses."'123 Under the full privatization with limits
approach, the Commonwealth would sell, through an auction-based
process, a predetermined number of licenses permitting private entities to
sell alcohol. 24  Wholesale licenses would be separate from retail
licenses, and the maximum number of wholesale licenses would be
significantly lower than the maximum number of retail licenses. 25 The
Commonwealth would need to find the optimal number of each type of
license because allocating too few licenses could cause insufficient
market competition, while allocating too many licenses would saturate
the market, thus lowering the value of the licenses.26  But, if the
Commonwealth is willing to relinquish control over the number of retail
licenses issued, then the need for an optimal number of retail licenses
could be eliminated by adopting PFM's second recommended plan. 1
27
B. PFM Plan 2: Limited Wholesale Licensing and Open Retail
Licensing Approach
PFM's second recommended plan calls for the "[a]uction [of]
limited wholesale licenses, [and] open market-based retail licenses."'
128
Under the limited wholesale and open retail licensing approach,
wholesale licenses would be sold at auction, just as wholesale licenses
are handled under the previous approach.129 Unlike the first approach,
121. Id. at7.
122. See id. at 65.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 60.
125. See PuB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 9-10.
126. See id. at 60.
127. See infra Part III.B.
128. Pun. FN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 65.
129. See id. at 60.
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however, retail licenses would not be sold through an auction process. 130
Rather than auctioning a predetermined number of retail licenses, the
Commonwealth would sell retail licenses to all qualified applicants. 
1 31
Consequently, the supply and demand forces of the market, instead of the
Commonwealth, would determine the optimal number of retail
licenses.132 Choosing between the two PFM plans depends on whether
the Commonwealth wants to retain control over the number of retail
licenses or relinquish control to allow the market to set the optimal price
for licenses. Ultimately, both of the plans would benefit the
Commonwealth and its citizens more than the current monopoly
system. 133
IV. WHY PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD PRIVATIZE
A. Predicted Effects of Privatization in Pennsylvania
An analysis of the economic and social effects of privatization leads
to the logical recommendation that the Commonwealth should adopt a
license system.134 By implementing a license system, consumers will
enjoy greater alcohol availability 135 and could pay the same or even
slightly less for alcohol.136  The increased availability will draw
consumers who currently patronize out-of-state alcohol stores back to
Pennsylvania stores, allowing the Commonwealth to recapture the
significant retail tax revenue that is currently being lost to border
states.137  Furthermore, privatization will eliminate most of the
Commonwealth's costly burden of operating retail alcohol stores.38 In
addition, the Commonwealth will also be able to achieve fiscal
neutrality139 and uphold the current levels of social well-being.
140
Because the Commonwealth can potentially increase citizens'
satisfaction regarding alcohol purchases while also sustaining its current
economic and social well-being, the Commonwealth should adopt a
license system.





134. Infra Part V.A.
135. Infra Part V.A.1.
136. Infra Part IV.A.3.
137. Infra Part IV.A.1.
138. Infra Part IV.A.2.
139. Infra Part IV.A.2.
140. Infra Part IV.A.4.
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Commonwealth
Evidence suggests that the effects of a license system, such as
increased volume of alcohol sales and alcohol consumption, will be
particularly strong if such a system is implemented in Pennsylvania.
14 1
Specifically, greater consumer convenience due to increased alcohol
availability and a reduction in border bleed would lead to greater in-state
alcohol sales. 142 Compared to national averages, the current amount of
alcohol consumption in many areas of Pennsylvania is lower than
expected given population density and household income levels. 143 This
discrepancy indicates that consumer convenience is a significant driver
of alcohol sales. 144 In fact, when Pennsylvania greatly improved
convenience by permitting government owned alcohol retail stores to sell
alcohol during limited hours on Sundays,145 overall alcohol sales
increased. 146
The increased sales of alcohol that resulted from these Sunday sales
also highlights the severity of the border bleed problem147 in
Pennsylvania. 148 While border bleed is a problem for monopoly states in
general, a study commissioned by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board specifically found that, in eight counties on the eastern
Pennsylvania border,149 Pennsylvania residents who purchase alcohol
outside of the Commonwealth account for $180 million in lost alcohol
sales.150 Pennsylvania's border bleed problem is likely exacerbated by
the Commonwealth's geographical population distribution, as 31 percent
of Pennsylvania's citizens reside in the Southeastern region,151 bordered
by three states with license systems.152  Hence, Pennsylvania is in
141. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 103-24.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 108.
144. See id.
145. See Pennsylvania Gets Taste of Sunday Liquor Sales, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10,
2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/10/nation/na-boozelO.
146. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 108.
147. Supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
148. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 103.
149. The eight counties are Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Lehigh, Montgomery,
Northampton, and Philadelphia. CF Study: Booze Border Bleed Loses Billion in Taxes,
Sales, COMMONWEALTH FOUND. (Sep. 1, 2011),
http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/research/detai/cf-study-booze-border-bleed-
loses-billions-in-taxes-sales.
150. PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 103.
151. Economy League of Greater Philadelphia, Southeastern Pennsylvania nd the
Commonwealth Budget 3 (Jan. 2011) (Working Paper) (available at
http://economyleague.org/node/1505?f=publications/reports).




particular need of a solution to the border bleed problem.153 A license
system is an ideal answer to this issue. The Commonwealth should also
adopt a license system because the benefits of such a system can be
gained at minimal cost by achieving fiscal neutrality.
2. Achieving Fiscal Neutrality with Privatization
Arguing that the Commonwealth should adopt a license system
implies that the benefits of privatization outweigh the costs. This
conclusion hinges on the presumption that adopting a license system will
not severely disrupt the Commonwealth's established budget scheme.
Disruption of the budget scheme is a significant threat given that states
with monopoly systems typically generate greater alcohol-related
revenues than states with license systems. 154 In order to avoid disturbing
the Commonwealth's budget, Pennsylvania should carefully adopt a
privatization plan that ensures fiscal neutrality. 
155
The Commonwealth should implement either of PFM's proposed
license system plans because both are carefully crafted to achieve fiscal
neutrality. 156 Switching from a monopoly system to a license system
would necessarily deprive the Commonwealth of $544 million, 57 gained
annually from mark-ups on the sale of alcohol products.1 58 Adoption of
any license system would, however, also eliminate the cost of operating
state-owned stores,159 saving the Commonwealth approximately $458
million per year. 60 In order to compensate for the resulting $86 million
deficit,16' the Commonwealth would need to adopt a plan that generates
153. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 111 (concluding that Pennsylvania
could regain more alcohol sales from border states, compared to Iowa, because Iowa's
two most populated areas are both more than an hour's drive from the nearest border
state).
154. Supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
155. In the context of switching from a monopoly system to a license system,
achieving fiscal neutrality means that after subtracting the Commonwealth's alcohol
regulation related expenses from the Commonwealth's alcohol regulation related
revenue, the net fiscal impact under the new license system would be approximately
equal to the net fiscal impact under the Commonwealth's current monopoly system. See
PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 7.
156. See id. at 77.
157. See id. at 8.
158. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
159. Supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
160. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 8. The Commonwealth would still
have operating expenses that include regulatory, licensing, and administrative functions,
but the elimination of government-owned retail and wholesale stores would dramatically
reduce the total expenses. See id. at 79.
161. The $86 million deficit refers to the mathematical difference between the
Commonwealth's gain of $458 million in reduced costs, supra note 160 and
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more than $86 million in revenues per year from licensing fees imposed
on wholesalers and retailers, 162 which could be accomplished by issuing
an approriate number of licenses under either of PFM's proposed
privatization plans. Researchers counsel that, under the full privatization
with limits plan, the Commonwealth should auction approximately 1500
retail licenses in order to enhance each license's value and maximize up-
front revenue.163  By the same reasoning, evidence suggests that the
Commonwealth should auction between 10 and 30 wholesale licenses if
the Commonwealth were to choose either plan. 164 Thus, if Pennsylvania
abides by researchers' suggestions, sufficient auction revenues and
license fees for the newly established wholesale and retail operations
could compensate for the $86 million deficit. 165 Therefore, the adoption
of either privatization plan could achieve fiscal neutrality for the
Commonwealth. The added benefits of privatization for consumers
could ultimately result in a net gain for the Commonwealth and its
citizens.
3. Paying the Same or Less for Alcohol
The Commonwealth should also adopt a license system because,
just as the Commonwealth could reap the benefits of privatization
without disrupting the budget,166 privatization also does not require
disrupting the price of alcohol.167  Although some consumers may
initially be disappointed by the lack of a significant price decrease,16 it
is a compromise that is necessary for the Commonwealth to achieve
fiscal neutrality.169 Substantially similar alcohol prices,170 coupled with
the enhanced availability of alcohol,171 would nevertheless provide
consumers with a net gain.
The idea that increased competition and more efficient operations,
characteristics typically associated with privately owned stores, result in
accompanying text, and the Commonwealth's loss of $544 million in mark-up revenue,
supra note 157 and accompanying text.
162. Supra notes 124, 130-31 and accompanying text.
163. See PuB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 9-10.
164. See id. at 10.
165. See id. at 77.
166. Supra Part IV.A.2.
167. Infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
168. See Amy Martinez, The Day Liquor Went Private and Prices Stumped the
Public, SEATrLE TIMES (June 1, 2012, 7:55 AM),
http://seattletimes.com/htm/localnews/2018331473-liquorO2.html.
169. Supra Part IV.A.2.
170. Infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
171. Supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
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lower alcohol prices for consumers in license states72 is intuitively
appealing. In reality, however, if the Commonwealth wishes to achieve
fiscal neutrality, then prices would likely not decrease substantially
because of licensing fees.'73 According to principles of tax incidence
analysis, suppliers pass the burden of a tax onto the consumers when a
change in price will not significantly affect the quantity of the product
consumed.7 4  Therefore, given that a change in price is unlikely to
significantly affect the amount of alcohol that consumers purchase,75 it
follows that suppliers would pass the burden of a tax onto the consumers
in the form of higher prices.
In a license system, the licensing fees imposed on alcohol suppliers,
which are not present under the Commonwealth's monopoly system, 1
76
would be treated by suppliers in the same way as taxes. 177 In other
words, the licensing fees would be passed from suppliers to consumers in
the form of increased prices for alcohol.178  After accounting for the
price-decreasing effect of competition,179 under the limited wholesale
and open retail licensing plan, the price of alcohol would likely stay the
same or be slightly lower than the current monopoly system price.
180
Similarly, under the full privatization with limits plan, the price of
alcohol would likely stay the same or increase slightly.'18 Therefore,
because the Commonwealth could remain fiscally neutral,8 2 the
Commonwealth should adopt a privatization plan.
4. Effect on Social Well-Being
Lastly, the Commonwealth could also avoid major social costs by
adopting a license system while continuing to enforce Pennsylvania dram
172. Supra notes 91, 95 and accompanying text.
173. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 9.
174. See 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 277 (William A.
Darity, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2008).
175. The demand for alcohol is likely inelastic because despite changes in price of
alcohol, consumers cannot readily substitute alcohol with another product when the price
of alcohol increases. See James Fogarty, The Demand for Beer, Wine and Spirits:
Insights from a Meta Analysis Approach 12 (Am. Ass'n of Wine Economists, Working
Paper No. 31, 2008), available at http://www.wine-
economics.org/workingpapers/AAWEWP31 .pdf.
176. Supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
177. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 99.
178. See id.
179. Supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
180. See PUB. FIN. MGMT., INC., supra note 71, at 9.
181. See id.
182. Supra Part IV.A.2.
2014]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
shop laws to combat alcohol-related crime.183 Even though states with
government-owned alcohol retail stores have reduced crime rates
associated with four types of crimes, 184 dram shop laws affect crime rates
more significantly than government ownership of retail stores.
85
Moreover, Pennsylvania has powerful, expansive dram shop laws that
maximize liability for licensed alcohol sellers. 1
86
First, Pennsylvania's dram shop laws cover all situations where a
licensed alcohol vendor sells alcohol to a consumer, whether the alcohol
is to be consumed on or off the vendor's premises.'87  Second,
Pennsylvania's dram shop laws provide both criminal penalties188 and
civil remedies if violated. 89  Lastly, alcohol vendors who violate
Pennsylvania dram shop laws are unlikely to escape civil liability
because "[a] violation of [Pennsylvania's dram shop laws] is deemed
negligence per se," so the plaintiff needs only to prove that the violation
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries.190  Because
Pennsylvania's dram shop laws extend to a wide range of alcohol related
transactions'91 and because violations are sufficient to prove per se
negligence, 192 the Commonwealth should trust Pennsylvania's dram shop
laws to keep crime rates stable after the adoption of a license system.
Overall, by adopting a license system, the citizens of Pennsylvania
would gain increased alcohol availability 93 at the same or potentially
lower prices. 194 Simultaneously, the Commonwealth would regain sales
lost from border bleed, 95 as well as eliminate the state burden of
operating alcohol retail stores.196 Although the Commonwealth would
lose revenue from mark-ups, the Commonwealth could nevertheless
achieve fiscal neutrality. 97 Moreover, adoption of a license system in
183. See 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-493 (West Supp. 2013); 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-497
(West 1997).
184. Supra note 111 and accompanying text.
185. Supra note 112 and accompanying text.
186. Infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
187. See §§ 4-493, 4-497.
188. See § 4-493.
189. See § 4-497.
190. Fandozzi v. Kelly Hotel, Inc., 711 A.2d 524, 525-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
(stating that Appellants needed only to prove that Appellee's employee or agent violated
47 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4-493 and that the violation was the proximate cause of Appellants'
injuries).
191. Supra note 187 and accompanying text.
192. Supra note 190 and accompanying text.
193. Supra Part V.A.1.
194. Supra Part 1V.A.3.
195. Supra Part IV.A. 1.
196. Supra Part 1V.A.2.
197. Supra Part 1V.A.2.
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the Commonwealth would leave crime rates unaffected.198  An
examination of the costs and benefits of privatization evidences support
for the Commonwealth's adoption of a license system. Furthermore,
upon an analysis of the historical reasons behind Pennsylvania's
monopoly system as compared to the Commonwealth's current needs, 199
it is evident that the Commonwealth no longer needs a monopoly system.
B. The Present Irrelevance of Historical Reasons for a Monopoly
System
When Governor Pinchot established Pennsylvania's monopoly
system, he was responding to influences that no longer trouble the
220
Commonwealth's citizens.2° ° Bootleggers, whose power was fueled by a
monopoly over alcohol sales during Prohibition,01 lost their monopoly
power when the repeal of Prohibition allowed others to sell alcohol
legally.202 Today's bars do not pose the same threats to social welfare as
did the Prohibition era saloons,0 3 which housed illegal gambling and
political corruption.0 4 In the past decade, Pennsylvania has begun to
offer legal outlets for gambling in the form of slot machines2 5 and table
games,20 6 thus moving recreational gambling operations to legitimate
venues. Likewise, the illegal ballot box stuffing that took place in
saloons207 is no longer an issue because Pennsylvania l w now prohibits
the operation of polling places within any building or room where
alcohol is served.20 8 Furthermore, the Great Depression-influenced idea
that a monopoly system maximizes the Commonwealth's revenue209 is
no longer persuasive in the face of more recent studies, which show that
adopting a carefully planned license system can be achieved while
maintaining fiscal neutrality.21 ° Since the time when Governor Pinchot
insisted that Pennsylvania needed a monopoly system to control
bootleggers, saloons, and the Commonwealth's financial stability, the
Commonwealth has experienced profound changes and no longer needs a
198. Supra Part IV.A.4.
199. Infra Part V.B.
200. Infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
201. Supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
203. Infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
204. Supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
205. See 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (West 2008).
206. See 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13A1 1 (West Supp. 2013).
207. Supra note 49 and accompanying text.
208. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2729 (West 2007).
209. Supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
210. Supra Part IV.A.2.
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monopoly system to serve those purposes. It is time to privatize in
Pennsylvania.
V. CONCLUSION
Under a cost-benefit analysis, the advantages of adopting of a
license system far outweigh any benefit that could be gained from
continuing under Pennsylvania's current monopoly system.21" ' The
Commonwealth no longer has any reason to deprive the citizens of a
license system.212 By adopting a license system, consumers would gain
the benefit of increased access to alcohol 13 at the same, or possibly
lower, prices than consumers currently pay.214 The Commonwealth
would also regain sales lost to border bleed,1 5 while eliminating the
costly burden of operating alcohol retail stores.216 Furthermore, none of
these benefits would come at the cost of fiscal imbalance217 or increased
crime rates.218 In addition to the benefits of adopting a license system,
the fact that the historical reasons for adopting a monopoly system have
become moot in today's modem society further indicates that a
monopoly system is no longer best for Pennsylvania.219 For the benefit
of the Commonwealth and its citizens, the Commonwealth should
abandon its alcohol monopoly system in favor of a privatized license
system.
211. See supra Part IV.A.
212. See supra Part IV.B.
213. Seesupra Part V.A.1.
214. See supra Part IV.A.3.
215. Seesupra Part V.A.1.
216. See supra Part IV.A.2.
217. See supra Part IV.A.2.
218. See supra Part IV.A.4.
219. See supra Part IV.B.
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